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In the United States and around the globe, governments are responding to climate change and energy security concerns by shifting their energy policies to facilitate the rapid devel-
opment of renewable energy.1 Today, wind energy is the fast-
est growing renewable technology,2 but in the rush to combat 
climate change, officials have often ignored another brewing 
conflict which looms larger with every turbine erected. It is a 
conflict between two would-be allies, wind developers and wild-
life conservationists, which if left unchecked has the potential to 
derail wind energy development in the United States.3 
The dispute centers around the dark secret of the wind 
industry: the fact that poorly sited turbines can kill large num-
bers of birds and bats.4 As wind farms spread across the coun-
try, many scientists and conservation groups are concerned that 
the cumulative effect will be devastating to already threatened 
bird and bat populations.5 Pressure is growing from conserva-
tion groups to enforce wildlife protection laws that the govern-
ment has only lightly enforced against wind farms so far.6 To 
date, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services (“FWS”), which is 
responsible for protecting bird and bat populations, has refused 
to initiate legal action against wind developers for their illegal 
taking of endangered bird species.7 Three federal statutes under 
the FWS’s jurisdiction—the Endangered Species Act, the Bald 
and Golden Eagle Protection Act, and the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act—could all be enforced against wind farm developers that 
illegally kill endangered or protected birds and bats.8 However, 
even the threat of such litigation could potentially be enough 
to end wind energy development in the United States by mak-
ing development too costly or too risky for investors.9 Under the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, for example, every knowing illegal 
taking of a migratory bird could lead to a $250,000–$500,000 
fine and up to two years in prison.10 
While conservation groups agree that protecting wildlife 
from the unnecessary danger posed by turbines is a significant 
concern, most agree that climate change poses a greater threat 
to wildlife and their habitat than do wind farms.11 Stopping all 
wind development is not a viable solution to the problem. Fortu-
nately there may be a middle ground. 
Studies show that bird fatalities are extremely varied from 
wind farm to wind farm and even between turbines in the same 
site, with some turbines producing almost no fatalities and oth-
ers killing hundreds.12 The Altamont Pass in California is the 
site of one of the oldest wind farms in the United States and is 
also a migratory bird route and home to North America’s largest 
population of Golden Eagles.13 It is estimated that every year 
4,700 birds are killed by turbines at Altamont Pass, compared 
to less than a hundred at similarly sized wind farms sited with 
avian impacts in mind.14 This provides strong evidence that a 
wind farm’s impact on birds and bird habitats can be greatly 
mitigated through proper siting, design, and management. 
Globally, avian mortality has typically not been part of wind 
farm impact assessments, but in 2003 the Council of Europe for 
the Bern Convention responded to this growing issue with rec-
ommendations and guidelines for including avian impact assess-
ments in wind farm development proposals.15 Since then, wind 
farm planning in the EU has included avian impact assessments 
and a number of wind farms have been rejected due to their 
potential deleterious impact on birds and bird habitat.16 Euro-
pean conservation groups are also creating bird impact maps to 
help planners assess the potential impacts of specific wind proj-
ects on birds and bird habitat.17 
The United States now needs mandatory federal regula-
tions that provide clear wind farm siting guidelines that include 
bird impact assessments. Unfortunately, there are currently no 
mandatory federal guidelines, and few state or local guidelines, 
regulating turbine siting. However, in 2007 the FWS convened 
a Wind Turbine Guidelines Advisory Committee to develop rec-
ommendations regarding minimizing the impacts of wind farm 
development.18 In March 2009 the Committee came back with 
its recommendations which include conducting pre-develop-
ment wildlife impact studies and avoiding locations identified 
as having a high potential risk to birds or bats, establishing non-
disturbance bird and bat buffer zones, and not locating turbines 
between daily roosting, feeding, and nesting sites.19 The Com-
mittee’s recommendations are expected to become the basis of 
new federal turbine siting guidelines.20 Such strategies will help 
reduce the building pressure between wind developers, conser-
vation groups, and officials by giving them a common means 
of collaboration without resorting to legal actions that have the 
potential to significantly impede wind energy development in 
the United States. 
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